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Abstract
We study minimal single-task peer prediction mechanisms
that have limited knowledge about agents’ beliefs. Without
knowing what agents’ beliefs are or eliciting additional infor-
mation, it is not possible to design a truthful mechanism in a
Bayesian-Nash sense. We go beyond truthfulness and explore
equilibrium strategy profiles that are only partially truthful.
Using the results from the multi-armed bandit literature, we
give a characterization of how inefficient these equilibria are
comparing to truthful reporting. We measure the inefficiency
of such strategies by counting the number of dishonest reports
that any minimal knowledge-bounded mechanism must have.
We show that the order of this number is Θ(logn), where
n is the number of agents, and we provide a peer prediction
mechanism that achieves this bound in expectation.
Introduction
One of the crucial prerequisites for a good decision making
procedure is the availability of accurate information, which
is often distributed among many individuals. Hence, elicita-
tion of distributed information represents a key component
in many systems that are based on informative decision mak-
ing. Typically, such an information elicitation scenario is
modeled by representing individuals as rational agents who
are willing to report their private information in return for
(monetary) rewards.
We study a setting in which reports cannot be directly
verified, as it is the case when eliciting opinions regarding
the outcome of a hypothetical question (Garcin and Faltings
2014). Other examples include: product reviewing, where
the reported information can describe ones taste, which is
inherently subjective1; peer grading, where a rater needs to
grade an essay; or eliciting information that is highly dis-
tributed, as in community sensing.
Since a data collector cannot directly verify the reported
information, it can score submitted reports only by examin-
ing consistency among them. Such an approach is adopted in
peer prediction mechanisms, out of which the most known
examples are the peer prediction method (Miller, Resnick,
Copyright by the authors. This is an extended version of the paper
that will appear in: Proceedings of the 32nd AAAI Conference on
Artificial Intelligence (AAAI’18).
1As, for example, in rating a restaurant or a hotel on TripAdvi-
sor (www.tripadvisor.com).
and Zeckhauser 2005) and the Bayesian truth serum (Pr-
elec 2004). While there are different ways of classifying
peer prediction mechanisms, the most relevant one for this
work distinguishes two categories of mechanisms by: 1) the
amount of additional information they elicit from agents; 2)
the knowledge they have about agents’ beliefs.
The first category includes minimal mechanisms that elicit
only desired private information, but have some additional
information that enables truthful elicitation. For instance, the
classical peer prediction (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser
2005) assumes knowledge about how an agent forms her
beliefs regarding the private information of other agents,
while other mechanisms (e.g., see (Jurca and Faltings 2011;
Witkowski 2014)) relax the amount of knowledge they need
by imposing different restrictions on the agents’ belief struc-
tures. Mechanisms from the second category elicit addi-
tional information to compensate for the lack of knowledge
about agents’ beliefs. For example, the Bayesian truth serum
(Prelec 2004), and its extensions (Witkowski and Parkes
2012b; Radanovic and Faltings 2013; Radanovic and Falt-
ings 2014; Kong and Schoenebeck 2016), elicit agents’ pos-
terior beliefs.
The mentioned mechanisms are designed for a single-
task elicitation scenario in which an agent’s private infor-
mation can be modeled as a sample from an unknown dis-
tribution. In a basic elicitation setting, agents share a com-
mon belief system regarding the parameters of the setting
(Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005; Prelec 2004). While
the mechanisms typically allow some deviations from this
assumption (Frongillo and Witkowski 2016; Radanovic and
Faltings 2014), these deviations can be quite constrained, es-
pecially when private information has a complex structure.2
We also mention mechanisms that operate in more spe-
cialized settings that allow agents to have more hetero-
geneous beliefs. Peer prediction without a common prior
(Witkowski and Parkes 2012a) is designed for a setting
in which a mechanism can clearly separate a period prior
to agents acquiring their private information from the pe-
riod after the acquisition. It elicits additional information
from agents which corresponds to their prior beliefs. More
2For example, (Radanovic and Faltings 2014) show that one
cannot easily relax the common prior condition when agents’ pri-
vate information is real-valued.
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recently, many mechanisms have been developed for a
multi-task elicitation scenario (Dasgupta and Ghosh 2013;
Kamble et al. 2015; Radanovic, Faltings, and Jurca 2016;
Shnayder et al. 2016a), primarily designed for crowdsourc-
ing settings. The particularities of the multi-task setting en-
able the mechanisms to implicitly extract relevant informa-
tion important for scoring agents (e.g., agents’ prior beliefs).
For more details on peer prediction mechanisms, we refer
the reader to (Faltings and Radanovic 2017).
Clearly, there is a tradeoff between the assumed knowl-
edge and the amount of elicited information. The inevitabil-
ity of such a trade-off can be expressed by a result of
(Radanovic and Faltings 2013), which states that in the
single-task elicitation setting, no minimal mechanism can
achieve truthfulness for a general common belief system.
Contributions. In this paper, we investigate single-task
minimal peer prediction mechanisms that have only limited
information about the agents’ beliefs, which precludes them
from incentivizing all agents to report honestly. To charac-
terize the inefficiency of such an approach, we introduce a
concept of dishonesty limit that measures the minimal num-
ber of dishonest agents that any minimal mechanism with
limited knowledge must allow. To the best of our knowl-
edge, no such characterization has ever been proposed for
the peer prediction setting. Furthermore, we provide a mech-
anism that reaches the lower bound on the number of dis-
honest agents. Due to the fact that the bound is logarithmic
in the number of reports, aggregated reports converge to the
true aggregate. Unlike the mechanism of (Jurca and Faltings
2008; Faltings, Jurca, and Radanovic 2017), that also has a
goal of eliciting an accurate aggregate, our mechanism does
not require agents to learn from each other’s reports.
The full proofs to our claims can be found in the appendix.
Formal Setting
We study a standard peer prediction setting where agents
are assumed to have a common belief regarding their pri-
vate information (Miller, Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005;
Prelec 2004). In the considered setting, a mechanism has al-
most no knowledge about the agents’ belief structure, which
makes the elicitability of truthful information more chal-
lenging (e.g., (Radanovic and Faltings 2013)). We define our
setting as follows.
There are n >> 1 agents whose arrival to the system
is stochastic. We group agents by their arrival so that each
group has a fixed number of k << n agents, and we con-
sider participation period of a group as a time t.
To describe how agents form beliefs about their private
information, we introduce a state ω, which is a random vari-
able that takes values in set Ω, which is assumed to be
a (real) interval. We denote the associated distribution by
p(ω), and assume that p(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω.
An agent’s private information, here called signal, is mod-
eled with a generic random variable X that takes values in a
finite discrete set {0, 1, ...,m− 1} whose generic values are
denoted by x, y, z, etc. For each agent i, her signal is gen-
erated independently according to a distribution Pr(Xi|ω)
that depends on state variable ω. This distribution is com-
mon for agents, i.e., Pr(Xi|ω) = Pr(Xj |ω) for two agents
i and j, and it is fully mixed, i.e., for all x ∈ {0, ...,m − 1}
it holds that Pr(X = x|ω) > 0. Furthermore, we as-
sume that private signals are stochastically relevant (Miller,
Resnick, and Zeckhauser 2005), meaning that posterior dis-
tributions Pr(Xj |Xi = x) and Pr(Xj |Xi = y) (obtained
from Pr(Xi|ω), Pr(Xj |ω) and p(ω)) differ for at least one
value of Xj whenever x 6= y. Agents share a common be-
lief about the model parameters of the model (Pr(X|ω) and
p(ω)), so we denote these beliefs in the same way.
Agents report their private information (signals) to a
mechanism, for which they get compensations in terms of
rewards. Agents might not be honest, so to distinguish the
true signalX from the reported one, we denote reported val-
ues by Y . Since our main result depends on agents’ coor-
dination, we also introduce a noise parameter that models
potential imperfections in reporting strategies. In particular,
we assume that with probability 1− ∈ (0, 1] an agent is ra-
tional and reports a value that maximizes her expected pay-
off, while otherwise she heuristically reports a random value
from {0, ...,m − 1}. Notice that we do not consider adver-
sarial agents. Furthermore, while in the development of our
formal results we assume that  is not dependent on Xi, we
also show how to apply our main mechanism when such a
bias exists (Section Additional Considerations).
A mechanism needs not know the true value of ; it only
needs to have an estimate ˆ that is in expectation equal to ,
and we show how to obtain ˆ from the reports. Furthermore,
the belief of a rational agent i incorporates the fact that a
peer report Yj is noisy, which means that Pr(Yj = x|Xi) =
(1− ) · Pr(X¯j = x|Xi) + m , where X¯j is the value that a
rational peer would report.
Beliefs about an agent’s signal or her report are defined
on the probability simplex in m-dimensional space, that we
denote by P . To simplify the notation for beliefs, we of-
ten omit X and Y symbols. In particular, instead of using
Pr(X = x|ω), we simply write Pr(x|ω), or instead of using
Pr(Xj = y|Xi = x), we write Pr(y|x).
The payments of a mechanism are denoted by τ and they
are applied on each group of k agents separately. We are in-
terested in 1-peer payment mechanisms that reward an agent
i by using her one peer j, i.e., the reward function is of the
form τ(Yi, Yj). As shown in (Radanovic and Faltings 2013),
this restriction does not limit the space of strictly incentive
compatible mechanisms when agents’ beliefs are not nar-
rowed by particular belief updating conditions. Furthermore,
we distinguish the notion of a mechanism, here denoted by
M, from a peer prediction payment function τ because dif-
ferent payment functions could be used on different groups
of agents, i.e., at different time periods t.
Solution concept. From the perspective of rational
agents, our setting has a form of a Bayesian game, hence we
explore strategy profiles that are Bayesian-Nash equilibria.
We are particularly interested in strict equilibria, in which ra-
tional agents have strict incentives not to deviate. Any mech-
anism that adopts honest reporting as a strict Bayesian-Nash
equilibrium is called strictly Bayesian-Nash incentive com-
patible (BNIC).
Our Approach
Let us begin by describing our approach in dealing with the
impossibility of truthful minimal knowledge-bounded elici-
tation. A mechanism that we are building upon is described
by the payment rule:
τ(x, y, P ) = d+ c ·
{
1
P (x) if x = y
0 otherwise
(1)
and is called the peer truth serum (PTS) (Faltings et al.
2014). P is a fully mixed distribution that satisfies:
Pr(x|x)
P (x)
>
Pr(y|x)
P (y)
, y 6= x (2)
Provided that other rational agents are honest, the expected
payoff of a rational agent with signal x for reporting y is:
c · (1− ) · Pr(y|x) +

m
P (y)
+ d
Selecting proper values for c and d is an orthogonal problem
to the one addressed in the paper, and is typically achieved
using a separate mechanism (Radanovic, Faltings, and Jurca
2016), a pre-screening process (Dasgupta and Ghosh 2013),
or by learning (Liu and Chen 2016). However, we do set
d = −c · ˆm·P (y) so that the expected payoff is proportional
to Pr(y|x)P (y) (because ˆ = E()). In other words, we remove
an undesirable skew in agents’ expected payoffs that might
occur due to the presence of non-strategic reports.3
Without additional restrictions on agents’ beliefs, it is
possible to show that the PTS mechanism is uniquely truth-
ful (Frongillo and Witkowski 2016). Condition (2) is called
the self-predicting condition, and it is crucial for ensuring
the truthfulness of PTS.4 We say that a distribution P is in-
formative if it satisfies the self-predicting condition. Instead
of assuming that a specific a priori known P satisfies con-
dition (2), we show that there always exists a certain set of
distribution functions for which the condition holds, and al-
though this set is initially not known, we show that one can
learn it by examining the statistics of reported values for dif-
ferent reporting strategies.
Phase Transition Diagram
We illustrate the reasoning behind our approach and a novel
mechanism on a binary answer space {0, 1}. In this case, it
has been shown that if we set P (x) to an agent’s prior belief
Pr(x), the self-predicting condition is satisfied, and, con-
sequently, the PTS mechanism is BNIC (Witkowski 2014).
However, in our setting, a mechanism has no knowledge
about Pr(x).
Consider what happens when P (x) is much smaller than
Pr(x). For signal value y 6= x, this means that P (y) is much
3Furthermore, notice that by setting c proportional to
∏
x P (x),
we can bound PTS payments so that they take values in [0, 1].
4The condition is typically defined for P (x) equal to the prior
Pr(x) (Jurca and Faltings 2011), but we generalize it here.
larger than Pr(y). If an agent observes x, her expected pay-
off when everyone is truthful is proportional to:
Pr(x|x)
P (x)
>
Pr(x|x)
Pr(x)
>
Pr(y|x)
Pr(y)
where the last inequality is due to the self-predicting con-
dition. Therefore, agents who observe x are incentivized to
report it. However, agents who observe y might not be in-
centivized to report truthfully, because if Pr(x)P (x) >
Pr(y|y)
Pr(y)
Pr(x|y)
Pr(x)
,
we have:
Pr(x|y)
P (x)
=
Pr(x|y)
Pr(x)
· Pr(x)
P (x)
>
Pr(y|y)
P (y)
In this case, one would naturally expect that both observa-
tions x and y lead to report x, and it is easy to verify that this
is an equilibrium of the PTS mechanism. Namely, the ex-
pected payoffs for reporting x only increase if more agents
report x. Similarly, when P (x) is much larger than Pr(x),
one would expect that agents would report y.
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Figure 1: Frequency of reports equal to x for different P(x).
With this reasoning, we can construct a phase transition
diagram, that shows how the expected frequency of reports
equal to x changes with the increase of P (x), for a fixed
posterior beliefs Pr(·|x) and Pr(·|y), y 6= x. The diagram is
shown in Figure 1, and it has three phases:
• Phase 1, in which agents are not truthful and report x.
• Phase 2, in which agents are truthful.
• Phase 3, in which agents are not truthful and report y.
Notice that not all reports are equal to x in phase 1 nor equal
to y in phase 3. This is due to the presence of noisy re-
ports. However, noisy reports are unbiased, so the frequency
freq2(x) of the truthful reporting phase is by Euclidian dis-
tance closer to 12 than are the frequencies of the other two
phases: (
1
2
− freq2(x)
)2
<
(
1
2
− freqi(x)
)2
where i ∈ {1, 3}, which gives us:
freq2(x) · (1− freq2(x)) > freq(x)i · (1− freqi(x))
As the expression also holds for signal y 6= x, it follows that
the disagreement among reports, i.e., probability that the two
reports do not match, is (strictly) maximized in the truthful
reporting phase. Therefore, we can use the disagreement as
an indicator of whether agents are truthful or not.
Furthermore, if ˆ needs to be obtained from the reports,
it is enough to acquire responses of k agents using PTS that
has d = 0 and P such that agents are clearly incentivized to
report a specific value. For example, one can set P (x) to a
small value, and define ˆ = 1− num(x)/k, where num(x)
is the number of agents who reported x. Notice that ˆ is in
expectation equal to 1− freq1(x) = , and this generalizes
to the non-binary case (but also  that depends on x (biased
noise)).
Mechanism: Adaptive PTS (AdaPTS)
Based on the previous observations, we now construct a
novel elicitation mechanism: AdaPTS. The first step of the
AdaPTS mechanism is to divide probability simplex P into
regions and accordingly sample from each region one fully
mixed representative P . In Figure 1, these representatives
are shown as black points on the horizontal axis and the di-
vision of the simplex is done uniformly. The granularity of
the division should be fine enough so that at least one rep-
resentative P falls into the truthfulness phase. To achieve
this, the PTS mechanism must have some knowledge about
the agents’ belief structure, but this knowledge can be very
limited. For example, to properly divide P , it is enough to
know the lower bound on the size of the region that contains
distributions P for which PTS is BNIC.
Furthermore, in such a discretization, one can always
choose representative P distributions that are in the interior
of the probability simplex, thus avoiding potential divisions
by 0 in equation (1). Notice that it is also possible to bound
payments to a desired interval by choosing an appropriate
value of c (see Footnote 2).
Now, the AdaPTS mechanism should define payment
function τ before each time step t, i.e., before a consid-
ered group of k agents start submitting their reports. We
want to maximize the number of honest agents, without
knowing for which representative distributions P agents
are honest. This can be translated to a (stochastic) multi-
armed bandit (MAB) setting5 (e.g., see (Agrawal 1995;
Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002; Audibert, Munos,
and Szepesva´ri 2009; Audibert and Bubeck 2010; Garivier
and Cappe´ 2011)) with arms defined as representative distri-
butions P and the optimization goal defined as maximizing
the number of honest agents.
As argued in the previous paragraph, the latter is the
same as maximizing the disagreement among reports. More
precisely, we define our objective function (feedback of
MAB) as an indicator function that counts the disagreements
among the reports of k agents:
I(Y1, ..., Yk) =
1
k · (k − 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1Yi 6=Yj (3)
5A most basic K-armed bandit problem is defined by random
variables ri,t, where i represent the arm of a bandit (gambling
machine) and ri,t represents the reward (feedback) obtained by
pulling the arm i at time step t. The goal is to maximize the to-
tal reward by sampling one arm at each time step.
Notice that the indicator function depends on a chosen rep-
resentative distribution P , while its associated distribution is
dependent on agents’ strategies and the underlying distribu-
tion from which agents’ private signals are sampled. There-
fore, at time step t, AdaPTS considers a group of k agents,
selects a representative P distribution according to a MAB
algorithm, and scores agents using the PTS mechanism with
the chosen representative P . After receiving the reports of
agents, the mechanism updates the parameters of the MAB
algorithm.
Although we could use any MAB algorithm with desir-
able regret features, in the following text we restrict our at-
tention to UCB1 (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002).
Algorithm 1 depicts the pseudocode of AdaPTS based on the
UCB1 algorithm (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002).
Function Discretize returns the set of representative P dis-
tributions for a given granularity γ, e.g., by uniformly dis-
cretizing the probability simplex as shown in Figure 1. Func-
tion Reports collects the reports of k agents whose rewards
are then calculated using PTS mechanism with parameter
P , where the peer of agent i is determined by index (i + 1)
mod k. Function EpsilonEstimate estimates the value ,
e.g., by acquiring responses of k agents for extremal values
of P , as described in the previous subsection.
Algorithm 1: AdaPTS
Data: Granularity γ > 0, Scaling c;
begin
RP = Discretize(P, γ);
ˆ = EpsilonEstimate(RP, k);
for t = 1 to t = |RP | do
P = RP [t];
x[1 : k] = Reports(P, k);
reward[i ∈ [1 : k]] =
c · 1x[i]=x[(i+1) mod k]P (x[i]) − c · ˆm·P (x[i]) ;
I[P ] = 1k·(k−1)
∑
i,j 6=i∈[1:k] 1x[i]6=x[j];
N [P ] = 1;
for t = |RP |+ 1 to t = T do
P =
RP
[
arg maxi
{
I[RP [i]]
N [RP [i]] +
√
2·ln(t−1)
N [RP [i]]
}]
;
x[1 : k] = Reports(P, k);
reward[i ∈ [1 : k]] =
c · 1x[i]=x[(i+1) mod k]P (x[i]) − c · ˆm·P (x[i]) ;
I[P ] = I[P ] + 1k·(k−1)
∑
i,j 6=i∈[1:k] 1x[i] 6=x[j];
N [P ] = N [P ] + 1;
Analysis
We first start by examining particular properties of our set-
ting, which imply the difficulty of our problem and also lead
us towards our main results. The major technical difficulty
is to show that there exists a distribution P for which mech-
anism (1) is truthful. This is not a trivial statement, since the
original PTS mechanism requires an additional condition to
hold, which is not necessarily satisfied in our setting. Fur-
thermore, we also need to show that (3) is an appropriate
indicator function. Given these two results, we can apply the
results from multi-armed bandit literature ((Lai and Robbins
1985; Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer 2002)) to derive the
logarithmic bounds on the dishonesty limit.
Correlation Among Signal Values
The first property we show is that there exist a limit on how
different signal values can be correlated in terms of agents
posterior beliefs. In particular, if an agent endorses informa-
tion x, there is an upper bound on the value of her belief
about a peer agent endorsing information y 6= x.
Lemma 1. We have:
Pr(x|x) > Pr(x),∀x
Furthermore, it holds that:
Pr(x|x) · Pr(y|y) > Pr(y|x) · Pr(x|y),∀y 6= x
or more generally:
Pr(x1|x1) · · ·Pr(xm′ |xm′) > Pr(x2|x1) · · ·Pr(x1|xm′)
where 1 < m′ ≤ m, xi ∈ {0, ...,m− 1}, xi 6= xj for i 6= j.
Mechanisms with Limited Knowledge
The second property is that the truthful elicitation of all pri-
vate signals is not possible if a mechanism has no knowledge
about agents’ belief structure. This follows from Theorem
1 presented in (Radanovic and Faltings 2013), which states
that it is not possible to design a minimal payment scheme
that truthfully elicits private signals of all agents. While the
result was obtained for a slightly different information elici-
tation scenario, where no particular belief model is assumed,
it is easy to verify that it holds in our setting as well (the
proof does not use anything contradictory to our setting).
We explicitly state the impossibility of truthful information
elicitation due to its importance for the further analysis.
Theorem 1. (Radanovic and Faltings 2013) There exists no
payment function τ that is BNIC for every belief model that
complies with the setting.
Even if a mechanism does have some information about
agents, the result of Theorem 1 is likely to hold if this knowl-
edge is limited. We, therefore, define knowledge-bounded
mechanisms as mechanisms whose information about agents
is not enough to construct a BNIC payments function for all
admissible belief models.
Definition 1. An information structure is a limited knowl-
edge if one cannot construct a payment function τ that is
BNIC for every belief model that complies with the setting.
The AdaPTS mechanism assumes that a given granularity
structure of probability simplex P contains a representative
distribution P for which the PTS payment rule is BNIC. We
show in the following subsections that one can always par-
tition probability simplex P to obtain a desirable granular-
ity structure. Moreover, the following lemma shows that the
granularity structure of AdaPTS is not in general sufficient
to construct a BNIC payment rule.
Lemma 2. The information structure that AdaPTS has
about agents’ beliefs is allowed to be a limited knowledge.
Dishonesty Limit
While one cannot achieve incentive compatibility using
peer prediction with limited knowledge, dishonest responses
could be potentially useful for a mechanism to learn some-
thing about agents. This was noted in (Jurca and Faltings
2008), where the mechanism outputs a publicly available
statistic that converges to the desirable outcome - true dis-
tribution of private signals. The drawback of the mechanism
is that it relies on agents being capable of learning from each
other’s responses, meaning that they update their beliefs by
analyzing the changes in the public statistic.
Our approach is different. By inspecting agents’ re-
sponses, we aim to learn which incentives are suitable to
make agents respond truthfully. To quantify what can be
done with such an approach, we define dishonesty limit.
Definition 2. Dishonesty limit (DL) is the minimal expected
number of dishonest reports in any Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium of any minimal mechanism with a limited knowledge.
More precisely:
DL = min
M
min
σ
d(M, n, σ)
where d(M, n, σ) is the expected number of dishonest
agents in an equilibrium strategy profile σ of mechanismM
with n agents.
The following lemma establishes the order of the lower
bound of DL. Its proof is based on the result of (Lai and
Robbins 1985), while the tightness of the result is shown in
Section Main Results.
Lemma 3. The dishonesty limit is lower bounded by:
DL ≥ Ω(log(n))
Proof. By Definition 1, there exists no single mechanism
that incentivizes agents to report honestly if their belief
model is arbitrary. Suppose now that we have two mecha-
nisms τ1 and τ2 that are BNIC under two different (comple-
mentary) belief models, so that a particular group of agents
is truthful only for one mechanism. We can consider this sit-
uation from the perspective of a meta-mechanism M that
has to choose between τ1 and τ2. At a time-step t, M ob-
tains k reports — feedback, which, in general, is insufficient
for determining whether agents lied or not because agents’
observations are stochastic, while their reports contain noise.
Therefore, the problem of choosing between τ1 and τ2 is an
instantiation of a multi-armed bandit problem (see Section
Mechanism: Adaptive PTS (AdaPTS)). Since, in general, any
MAB algorithm pulls suboptimal arms Ω(log(N)) number
of times in expectation where N is the total number of pulls
(e.g., see (Lai and Robbins 1985)), we know that meta mech-
anismM will in expectation choose the wrong (untruthful)
payments at least O(log n) times. This produces O(log n)
untruthful reports in expectation because non-truthful pay-
ments are not truthful for at least one signal value and each
signal value has strictly positive probability of being en-
dorsed by an agent.
Existence of an Informative Distribution
The PTS mechanism is BNIC if the associated distribution
P satisfies the self-predicting condition, i.e., if P is infor-
mative. We now turn to the crucial property of our setting:
Proposition 1. There exists a region R ⊂ P in probability
simplex P , such that PTS is BNIC for any P ∈ R.
Indicator Function
Now, let us define a set of lying strategies that have the same
structure and in which agents report only a strict subset of
all possible reported values. For example, if possible values
are {0, 1, 2, 3} and agents are not incentivized to report hon-
estly value 3, then a possible lying strategy could be to report
honestly values 0, 1, 2, and instead of honestly reporting 3,
agents could report 2.
Definition 3. Consider a non-surjective function ρ :
{0, ...,m−1} → {0, ...,m−1}. A reporting strategy profile
is non-surjective if a report of a rational agent with private
signal X is Y = ρ(X).
Non-surjective strategies also include those that most nat-
urally follow from a simple best response reasoning: agents
who are not incentivized to report honestly, deviate by mis-
reporting, which necessarily reduces the set of values that ra-
tional agents report. This type of agents’ reasoning basically
corresponds to the player inference process explained in
(Waggoner and Chen 2014). Without specifying how agents
form their reporting strategy, we show that in PTS there al-
ways exists an equilibrium non-surjective strategy profile. In
Subsection Allowing Smoother Transitions Between Phases,
we discuss how to use our approach when agents are not per-
fectly synchronized in adopting non-surjective strategies.
Proposition 2. For any fully mixed distribution P , there ex-
ists a non-surjective strategy profile that is a strict equilib-
rium of the PTS mechanism.
Notice that even for non-surjective strategy profiles, the
set of reported values that a mechanism receives does not
reduce, i.e., it is equal to {0, ...,m − 1}. This follows from
the fact that not all agents are rational in a sense that they
comply with a prescribed strategy profile (i.e., some report
random values instead). Nevertheless, the statistical nature
of reported values change: reports received by the mecha-
nisms have smaller number of disagreements.
Lemma 4. The expected value E(I(Y1, ..., Yk)) of the indi-
cator function defined by (3) is strictly greater for truthful
reporting than for any non-surjective strategy profile.
Main Results
From Proposition 1, Proposition 2, and Lemma 4, we obtain
the main property of the AdaPTS mechanism: its ability to
substantially bound the number of dishonest reports in the
system.
Theorem 2. There exists a strict equilibrium strategy profile
of the AdaPTS mechanism such that the expected number of
non-truthful reports is of the order of O(log n).
Proof. Consider a reporting strategy in which agents are
honest whenever P is such that truthful reporting is a strict
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of PTS (by Proposition 1, such
P always exists), and otherwise they use an equilibrium non-
surjective strategy profile (which by Proposition 2 always
exists). We use the result that the UCB1 algorithm is ex-
pected to pull a suboptimal arm log(N) times, where N is
the total number of pulls (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer
2002). By Lemma 4, the representative P of a truthful re-
porting region is an optimal arm, while the representative
P of a non-truthful region is a suboptimal arm. Further-
more, the number of pulls in our case corresponds to n/k,
where n is the total number of agents and k is the number
of agents at time period t. Since k << n is a fixed param-
eter, the expected number of lying agents is of the order of
O(log(n)).
Notice that we have not specified an exact equilibrium
strategy that satisfies the bound of the theorem. For the the-
orem to hold, it suffices that agents adopt truthful reporting
when P in AdaPTS is such that PTS is BNIC, while they
adopt any non-surjective strategy profile when P is such that
PTS is not BNIC. As explained in the previous section, a
simple best response reasoning can lead to such an outcome.
Since AdaPTS is allowed to have a bounded knowledge
information structure (Lemma 2), from Theorem 2 it fol-
lows that the dishonesty limit is upper bounded byO(log n).
From Lemma 3, we know that the dishonesty limit is lower
bounded by Ω(log n). Therefore:
Theorem 3. The dishonesty limit is:
DL = Θ(log n)
Importance of the results. With the dishonesty limit con-
cept, we are able to quantify what is possible in the context
of minimal elicitation with limited knowledge. An exam-
ple of an objective that is possible to reach with partially
truthful mechanisms is elicitation of accurate aggregates. In
particular, suppose that the goal is to elicit a distribution of
signal values. From Theorem 2, we know that this is achiev-
able with AdaPTS. Namely, if we denote the normalized his-
togram of reports byHreports and the normalized histogram
of signal values byHvalues, then it follows from the theorem
that their expected difference is bounded by:
E(
∑
x
|Hreports(x)−Hvalues(x)|) ≤ O(log n)
n
which approaches 0 as n increases. Therefore, although the
truthfulness of all agents is not guaranteed, the aggregate
obtain by the partially truthful elicitation converges to the
one that would be obtained if all agents were honest.
Additional Considerations
In this section, we discuss how to make our mechanism
AdaPTS applicable to the situations when there exist biases
in reporting errors (i.e.,  parameter is biased towards a par-
ticular value) or the phase transitions are smoother (e.g., be-
cause reporting strategies are not perfectly synchronized).
Allowing Bias in the Non-strategic Reports. Allowing
biases in reporting errors is important for cases when some
agents do not strategize w.r.t. parameter P , e.g., these agents
are truthful regardless of the payment function, or they re-
port heuristically without observing their private signal (for
example, a fraction of agents reports 0, whereas the other
agents are strategic). An example of the phase transition di-
agram that incorporates a bias is shown in Figure 2. Since the
disagreement is highest for phase 1 of the diagram, function
(3) is not a good indicator of agents’ truthfulness. However,
frequency freq2(x) of the truthful phase is the closest one to
the average of fm(x) = freq1(x) and fm(x) = freq3(x).
By the same reasoning as in Section Our Approach, the ex-
pression (fm(x)− freqi(x)) · (freqi(x)− fm(x)) is max-
imized for i = 2. This leads us the following indicator func-
tion:
I(Y1, ...., Yk) =
∑
x
(fm(x)− fˆ(x)) · (fˆ(x)− fm(x))
where fˆ is the frequency of reports equal to x among
{Y1, ..., Yk}. The problem, however, is that the AdaPTS
mechanism does not know fm and fm. Nevertheless, it can
estimate them in an online manner from agents’ reports.
To adjust AdaPTS, we first define time intervals θi =
{2i, ..., 2i+1} and to each time interval associate a differ-
ent UCB1 algorithm. For periods t ∈ θi, we run a (separate)
UCB1 algorithm with the indicator function that uses esti-
mators fˆm(x) and fˆm(x). The estimators are initially set to
fˆm(x) = 0 and fˆm(x) = 1 for all values x, and they change
after each time interval θi. More precisely, they are updated
by finding respectively the minimum and the maximum fre-
quency of reports equal to x among all possible arms (repre-
sentative distributions P ). Since UCB1 sufficiently explores
suboptimal arms, the estimates fˆm(x) and fˆm(x) become
reasonable accurate at some point, which implies a sublinear
number of dishonest reports for a longer elicitation period.
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Figure 2: Phase transition diagram with biased phases.
Allowing Smoother Transitions Between Phases.
Agents may not be perfectly synchronized in changing be-
tween phases. Nonetheless, we can expect that the result-
ing behaviour would produce a similar phase transition dia-
gram, as illustrated in Figure 3. However, the simple indica-
tor function defined by expression (3) is no longer a suitable
choice for detecting the truthful reporting phase.
In order to see this, we have added additional represen-
tative distributions P . Notice that we obtain the same dis-
agreement for P (x) = 0.4 as for P (x) = 0.6. However,
P (x) = 0.6 is a better choice, because P (x) = 0.4 belongs
to a transition phase where a high level of disagreement is
due to asynchronous behaviour of agents. Notice that the
phase diagram experiences rapid changes in transitions be-
tween two phases. This means that we can avoid selection
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Figure 3: Phase transition diagram with smooth transitions.
of undesirable P distributions by introducing a proper reg-
ularization term. That is, we can separate k agents that ar-
rive at time t into two groups, G1 and G2, and reward each
group with a slightly different P from the one selected by
UCB1. For example, if P (x) = 0.4 is selected, we could re-
ward one group using PTS with P (x) = 0.35 and the other
group using PTS with P (x) = 0.45. If group G1 has agents
{a1, ..., a4} and groupG2 has agents {b1, ..., b4}, then a pos-
sible indicator function could be:
I(Y1, ...., Yk) =
∑
ai,aj∈G1
1Yai 6=Yaj +
∑
bi,bj∈G2
1Ybi 6=Ybj︸ ︷︷ ︸
disagreement
− λ · (1Ya1 6=Ya2 − 1Yb1 6=Yb2 ) · (1Ya3 6=Ya4 − 1Yb3 6=Yb4 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
regularization
where λ > 0 is the regularization factor. The regularization
term is in expectation equal to the square of the difference
between the expected disagreement of agents in group G1
and the expected disagreement of agents in group G2. Some
insight on how to adjust λ might be a priori needed, but this
information is a limited knowledge. With this modification
of the indicator function, we can apply AdaPTS.
Conclusion
We investigated the asymptotic behavior of partially truthful
minimal peer prediction mechanisms with a limited knowl-
edge. As shown by Theorem 3, any such mechanism results
in O(log n) redundant (non-truthful) reports. In contrast,
one of the most known knowledge-bonded elicitation mech-
anism, Bayesian Truth Serum (Prelec 2004), elicits from
each agent her signal value and her prediction about other
agents, having in totalO(n) additional reports. Thus, our re-
sults quantify the necessary overhead when the minimality
in reported information and the knowledge of a mechanism
is preferred to full truthfulness. One of the most important
future steps would be to make the mechanism robust in terms
of collusion resistance (e.g., measured using replicator dy-
namics (Shnayder et al. 2016b)), which, in general, can be
challenging even for a more robust settings (Gao, Wright,
and Leyton-Brown 2016).
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ATTACHMENT: Partial Truthfulness in Peer
Prediction Mechanisms with Limited
Knowledge
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Using the properties of our model (conditional in-
dependence of signal values given ω) and Bayes’ rule we
obtain:
Pr(x|x) =
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω|x)dω =
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω)2 · p(ω)
Pr(x)
dω
=
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω)2 · p(ω)dω∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω
Jensen’s inequality tells us that
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω)2 · p(ω)dω ≥
(
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω)2, with strict inequality when 0 <
Pr(x|ω) < 1 (notice that Pr(x|ω) is not constant due to
stochastic relevance). As Pr(x|ω) is fully mixed, we have:
Pr(x|x) >
(∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω)2∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω >
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω
= Pr(x)
implying the first statement.
From Bayes’ rule it follows that Pr(x|x)·Pr(y|y) is equal
to:
Pr(x|x) · Pr(y|y)
=
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω)2 · p(ω)dω∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω ·
∫
ω
Pr(y|ω)2 · p(ω)dω∫
ω
Pr(y|ω) · p(ω)dω (4)
Similarly, Pr(y|x) · Pr(x|y) is equal to:
Pr(y|x) · Pr(x|y)
=
∫
ω
Pr(y|ω) · Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · p(ω)dω
·
∫
ω
Pr(x|ω) · Pr(y|ω) · p(ω)dω∫
ω
Pr(y|ω) · p(ω)dω (5)
Notice that expressions (4) and (5) have equal denominators,
so we only need to compare nominators. LetA andB be two
random variables such that A = Pr(x|ω) and B = Pr(y|ω).
We have:
sgn (Pr(x|x) · Pr(y|y)− Pr(x|x) · Pr(y|y))
= sgn
(
Eω(A
2) · Eω(B2)− Eω(A ·B)2
)
Eω is expectation over the distribution p(ω). Using the
Cauchy-Schwarz inequality (Eω(A2) · Eω(B2) ≥ |Eω(A ·
B)|2, with strict inequality if A,B 6= 0 and A 6= λ · B),
and the fact that A and B are positive random variables that
differ due to stochastic relevance, we obtain that Pr(x|x) ·
Pr(y|y) > Pr(y|x) · Pr(x|y) for x 6= y.
The third claim follows analogously. Namely, the
nominator of (4) is in more general form equal to
Eω(A
2
1) · · ·Eω(A2m′), while the nominator of (5) is in more
general form equal to Eω(A1 ·A2) · · ·Eω(Am′ ·A1), where
Ai = Pr(xi|ω). By applying the Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity, we obtain the claim.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Consider two arbitrary probability distribution func-
tions P1 and P2, such that: P1(x) = P2(y), P1(y) = P2(x),
and P1(z) = P2(z) for z 6= x and z 6= y. PTS with
P1 is truthful for belief model defined by Pr1(z|z) =
P1(z) + (1 − P1(z)) · β, Pr(w|z) = P1(w) − P1(w) · β
, ∀z, w ∈ {0, ...,m − 1} : w 6= z, where β ∈ (0, 1).
Similarly, we define posteriors Pr2 based on P2. Notice that
Pr2(w|z) = Pr1(u(w)|u(z)), where u : {0, ...,m − 1} →
{0, ...,m− 1}:
u(z) =

y if z = x
x if z = y
z if z 6= x ∧ z 6= y
Now, suppose that P1(x) > P1(y), and set up β such
that: Pr1(x|x) > Pr1(y|x) and Pr1(y|y) < Pr1(x|y). By
using the same procedure of proving as in Theorem 1 of
(Radanovic and Faltings 2013), we obtain that if a mecha-
nism τ is incentive compatible for both Pr1 and Pr2, then:
(Pr1(x|x)− Pr1(y|x)) · (∆(x)−∆(y)) > 0
(Pr1(y|y)− Pr1(x|y)) · (∆(x)−∆(y)) > 0
where ∆(x) = τ(x, x) − τ(x, y) and ∆(y) = τ(y, x) −
τ(y, y). The two inequalities, however, contradict by the
choice of Pr1.
Therefore, even though a mechanism might know the size
of a region in probability simplex P that contains distribu-
tions P for which PTS is BNIC, it might not be able to con-
struct a BNIC payment rule.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. By Definition 1, there exists no single mechanism
that incentivizes agents to report honestly if their belief
model is arbitrary. Suppose now that we have two mecha-
nisms τ1 and τ2 that are BNIC under two different (comple-
mentary) belief models, so that a particular group of agents
is truthful only for one mechanism. We can consider this sit-
uation from the perspective of a meta-mechanism M that
has to choose between τ1 and τ2. At a time-step t, M ob-
tains k reports — feedback, which, in general, is insufficient
for determining whether agents lied or not because agents’
observations are stochastic, while their reports contain noise.
Therefore, the problem of choosing between τ1 and τ2 is an
instantiation of a multi-armed bandit problem (see Section
Mechanism: Adaptive PTS (AdaPTS)). Since, in general, any
MAB algorithm pulls suboptimal arms Ω(log(N)) number
of times in expectation where N is the total number of pulls
(e.g., see (Lai and Robbins 1985)), we know that meta mech-
anismM will in expectation choose the wrong (untruthful)
payments at least O(log n) times. This produces O(log n)
untruthful reports in expectation because non-truthful pay-
ments are not truthful for at least one signal value and each
signal value has strictly positive probability of being en-
dorsed by an agent.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition is the direct consequence of the two follow-
ing lemmas.
Lemma 5. If there exists an informative distribution P ∈
P , where P is probability simplex for m-ary signal space,
then there exists a region R ⊂ P such that all P ′ ∈ R are
informative.
Proof. Since P is informative:
Pr(x|x)
P (x)
>
Pr(y|x)
P (y)
for all x 6= y. The strictness of the inequality implies that
there exists 0 < δ << minz Pr(z) such that for all x 6= y
we have:
Pr(x|x)
P (x) + δ
>
Pr(y|x)
P (y)− δ
In other words, we have that any P ′ ∈ P for which |P ′(x)−
P (x)| ≤ δ, x ∈ {1, ...,m}, satisfies:
Pr(x|x)
P ′(x)
>
Pr(y|x)
P ′(y)
By putting R = {P ′|P ′ ∈ P,∀x : |P ′(x) − P (x)| < δ},
we obtain the claim.
Lemma 6. There exists an informative distribution P .
Proof. We only need to show the existence of P . Consider a
specific signal value a ∈ {0, ...,m−1} and any other signal
value x ∈ {0, ...,m− 1}. Let us define P as:
P (a) =
1
α
P (x) =
1
α
· min
y∈{0,...,m−1}
[
Pr(x|x)
Pr(y|x) ·
Pr(y|y)
Pr(a|y)
]
where 1α is a normalization factor so that∑
y∈{0,...,m−1} P (y) = 1. Notice that by Lemma 1:
Pr(x|x)
Pr(y|x) ·
Pr(y|y)
Pr(a|y) >
Pr(x|a)
Pr(a|a) (6)
holds for any y ∈ {0, ...,m − 1}. To prove that P is in-
formative, it is sufficient to show that for any signal values
x 6= z 6= a we have:
Pr(a|a)
P (a)
>
Pr(x|a)
P (x)
Pr(x|x)
P (x)
≥ Pr(a|x)
P (a)
Pr(x|x)
P (x)
>
Pr(z|x)
P (z)
Provided that these inequalities hold, the second one can be
made strict (while keeping the other two inequalities strict as
well) by reducing all P (x), x 6= a, by a small enough value,
and then re-normalizing P .
The first inequality follows from Pr(a|a)P (a) = α · Pr(a|a)
and inequality (6):
Pr(x|a)
P (x)
= α · Pr(x|a)
miny∈{0,...,m−1}
[
Pr(x|x)
Pr(y|x) · Pr(y|y)Pr(a|y)
]
< α · Pr(x|a)
Pr(x|a)
Pr(a|a)
= α · Pr(a|a) = Pr(a|a)
P (a)
We obtain the second inequality by putting y = a:
Pr(x|x)
P (x)
= α · Pr(x|x)
miny∈{0,...,m−1}
[
Pr(x|x)
Pr(y|x) · Pr(y|y)Pr(a|y)
]
≥ α · Pr(x|x)
Pr(x|x)
Pr(a|x)
= α · Pr(a|x) = Pr(a|x)
P (a)
For the third inequality, we use the second inequality and
inequality Pr(x|x) · Pr(z|z) > Pr(z|x) · Pr(x|z), which
follows from Lemma 1. We have:
Pr(z|x)
P (z)
<
Pr(x|x) · Pr(z|z)
Pr(x|z) ·
1
P (z)
=
Pr(x|x) · Pr(z|z)
Pr(x|z) ·
α
miny∈{0,...,m−1}
[
Pr(z|z)
Pr(y|z) · Pr(y|y)Pr(a|y)
]
≤ α · Pr(x|x) · Pr(z|z)
Pr(x|z) ·
[
Pr(z|z)
Pr(x|z) · Pr(x|x)Pr(a|x)
] = α · Pr(a|x)
=
Pr(a|x)
P (a)
≤ Pr(x|x)
P (x)
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. One equilibrium non-surjective strategy profile is
when agents report value x such that P (x) = minz P (z).
Let us denote by P˜ r an agent i’s belief regarding the report
of her peer agent j, i.e., Yj , for the considered strategy pro-
file. Notice that P˜ r(y|x) = m ≥ 0 for y 6= x (due to the
reporting noise). However, the strategy profile of reporting x
is an equilibrium because the expected value of ˆ is equal to
, so in expectation c· P˜ r(y|x)P (y) −d = c· m·P (y)−c· m·P (y) = 0
for y 6= x, while c · P˜ r(x|x)P (x) − d > 0. That is, an agent’s
expected payment is strictly maximized when she reports
x.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. Since a non-surjective reporting strategy is a non-
surjective function of observation Xi, we know that ρ(Xi)
takes values in a strict subset of all possible signal values.
The disagreement function is linear in 1Yi 6=Yj , so it is suffi-
cient to show that 11− ·(1Yi 6=Yj− m ) is in expectation greater
for truthfulness than for non-surjective reporting strategy
profile. In expectation, the expression is equivalent to say-
ing whether two reports of rational agents disagree, which is
equal to 1−pa, where pa is the probability of agreement. The
probability of agreement in a non-surjective strategy profile
is equal to:
pa,ns =
∑
x
Pr({z|ρ(z) = ρ(x)}, x) >
∑
x
Pr(x, x) = pa,t
where the last term is the probability of agreement for
truthfulness. Notice that the inequality is strict because in
a non-surjective strategy profile there exist x and y for
which ρ(x) = ρ(y), and thus, Pr({z|ρ(z) = ρ(x)}, x) ≥
Pr({x, y}, x) = Pr(x, x) + Pr(y, x) > Pr(x, x). The
last inequality follows from agents’ beliefs being fully
mixed. Since pa,t is strictly smaller than pa,ns for any non-
surjective strategy profile, we conclude that the disagree-
ment is strictly greater for truthful reporting than for any
other non-surjective strategy profile.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Consider a reporting strategy in which agents are
honest whenever P is such that truthful reporting is a strict
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of PTS (by Proposition 1, such
P always exists), and otherwise they use an equilibrium non-
surjective strategy profile (which by Proposition 2 always
exists). We use the result that the UCB1 algorithm is ex-
pected to pull a suboptimal arm log(N) times, where N is
the total number of pulls (Auer, Cesa-Bianchi, and Fischer
2002). By Lemma 4, the representative P of a truthful re-
porting region is an optimal arm, while the representative
P of a non-truthful region is a suboptimal arm. Further-
more, the number of pulls in our case corresponds to n/k,
where n is the total number of agents and k is the number
of agents at time period t. Since k << n is a fixed param-
eter, the expected number of lying agents is of the order of
O(log(n)).
